TAIPEI—No matter how desperately China hankers for unification with Taiwan, a strong conviction that time is on its side has long trumped its temptation to use bullying tactics to force the outcome.

不论中国多麽急切地想要统一台湾，一个坚定的信念在这个时候早就战胜了利诱胁迫。

Eventually, the Chinese thinking goes, the Taiwanese will come to the conclusion that their future lies in economic integration with the mainland, and that once the two economies are thoroughly enmeshed a political settlement will end an estrangement that has lasted since 1949, when the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war on the mainland.

中国最终的想法是台湾人未来会走向与大陆的经济统一，只要两国经济彻底融合就会结束国民党自1949年从大陆战败後撤守台湾的政治隔阂。

So while batteries of Chinese missiles still point toward the island, tranquility has reigned across the Taiwan Strait.

所以尽管中国导弹仍对准台湾岛内，台海之间仍然保持宁静。

Perhaps not for much longer, as Beijing’s strategy of waiting it out now seems to be in tatters.

不过这可能不会持续太久，因为北京目前的应变策略似乎支离破碎了。

Presidential and legislative elections three months from now are likely to confirm that a drive by the Kuomintang under President Ma Ying-jeou for deeper economic engagement, far from encouraging public sentiment in favor of unification, is having the opposite effect.

还不到三个月的总统和立法委员选举现在很可能确定的是，马英九领导下的国民党进行经济交流的政策，远非激励民意促进统一，却是带来反效果的。

Popular attitudes toward China are actually hardening as economic convergence disproportionately benefits Taiwan businesses that have headed off to China at the expense of workers left behind. Among younger Taiwanese in particular, integration has bred despair as pay stagnates and property prices boom.

台湾民众对中国的态度实际上转为强硬，由于经济统合的不对等，是以台湾企业奔向中国舍弃劳工为代价的。特别是台湾年轻人中由于工资停滞和房地产价狂飙而对经济融合丧失信心。

Meanwhile, the Kuomintang itself, China’s former enemy and now its best hope for reaching a political deal, is self-destructing.

同时，这个中共以前的敌人国民党本身最希望达成的政治协议，也在自我毁灭。

It has picked a presidential candidate who is so pro-Beijing she’s unelectable. At the 11th hour, party elders are trying to dump Hung Hsiu-chu—dubbed Taiwan’s Sarah Palin for her outspokenness and polarizing views—and draft in Eric Chu, the party chairman and dynamic mayor of New Taipei City, who had earlier declined to run.

它选择的总统候选人太亲北京也不可能选赢。在大会的11点钟，党内大老试着把这位心直口快又极端而被戏称台湾版莎拉·佩林的洪秀柱，换成党主席兼新北市市长的朱立伦，他早前曾拒绝参选。

But Mr. Chu has almost certainly left it too late to beat the front-runner, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, though he might just be able to save the Kuomintang from losing control of the legislature for the first time.

不过朱立伦基本肯定要在这时击败领先的民进党蔡英文也为时已晚了，虽然这是他还可能拯救国民党输掉议会席次的第一次。

Even party insiders now fret about the Kuomintang’s future. The debacle over Ms. Hung’s candidacy has exposed an organization riven by factionalism. If it loses legislative control, the fear is that Ms. Tsai’s camp may strip it of assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars, a legacy of the days when it ran Taiwan as a single-party dictatorship.

就连国民党党内也在担忧该党的未来。这次换柱风波已经暴露出党内的派系分裂。如果失去了立法机构的控制，国民党害怕的是蔡英文与其同党将剥夺价值数亿美元的党产，这是一笔自台湾一党专政延续下来的遗产。

In putting its bets on its old adversary—with which it traditionally shared the belief in “One China” that includes Taiwan—Beijing has backed a loser, which leaves it with few options.

北京将其赌注押在它的老对手，那个同样与它们有传统共识的「一个中国」看来失败了，北京一直支持一个失败者，总是给它留下好几个选择。

Now, it faces the prospect of having to deal with a new Taiwan leader, Ms. Tsai, whose party attracts die-hard pro-independence supporters.

现在北京不得不面对要处理一个台湾新的领导人蔡英文，以及其民进党身後铁杆的台独支持者。

Ms. Tsai herself has taken a middle-of-the-road position in favor of the status quo, in which Taiwan enjoys de facto, even if not de jure, independence. “Tsai isn’t crazy,” says Chang Jung-feng, a former Taiwan national-security adviser. “She won’t declare independence.”

蔡英文已经采取中间路线的立场，赞成维持现况，也就是台湾享有事实独立，即便没有法律上的独立。"蔡英文并不疯狂"，前国策顾问张荣丰说。 "她不会宣布独立的"。

Still, without an unambiguous declaration by Ms. Tsai that she accepts Beijing’s “One China” position, and with no prospect of cozy deal-making, it’s possible Beijing’s patience may snap and it will shift tack from conciliation to coercion to complete the Communist Party’s most important piece of unfinished business.

即便如此，只要蔡英文没有一个明确的声明来接受北京的一个中国立场，以及没有阿谀奉承的交易愿景，北京的耐心很可能消失殆尽并会转变策略从怀柔到强逼来完成共产党最重要的一块而未完成的统一大业。

That could mean anything from squeezing Taiwan’s already narrow international space—stealing away its dwindling number of diplomatic friends, for instance—to applying pressure on its fragile economy, perhaps by slowing the flow of mainland Chinese tourists. Or something far worse. China has never abandoned the option of using force to reunite what it regards as a rogue province with the mainland.

这可能意味着北京挤压台湾原先就狭窄的国际空间，如偷走日益稀少的邦交国，或也许通过减缓中国大陆游客的流动人数对其脆弱的经济施压。或更糟糕的是，中国从未使用武力的选项来统一一个对大陆来说将台湾视为流氓的叛乱省。

The Chinese president likes to think he understands Taiwan; as a senior official in coastal provinces, Xi Jinping was on friendly terms with many Taiwan factory owners and investors.

中国领导人自认为很了解台湾，作为一名沿海省份的高官，习近平曾与很多台资的工厂老板和投资者关系友好。

Maybe, speculates Mr. Chang, the former national-security adviser, Mr. Xi will persevere with the old strategy of forbearance but in a smarter way by reaching beyond the Kuomintang and the wealthy elites and engaging ordinary Taiwanese and small-business owners.

前国策顾问张先生认为，习近平将继续宽容不变的老办法，但以更聪明的办法跳过国民党和富裕精英直接与台湾的小企业主展开交流。

That would require flexibility and imagination. So far, on every issue relating to China’s troubled periphery—Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang—Mr. Xi has taken an uncompromising line, doubling down on hard-line policies that have stirred popular resentments against Beijing.

这将需要费劲的灵活和想像力。而到目前为止，每个周边问题都困扰着中国：香港、西藏、新疆。习近平采取了不妥协的路线，在这些地区实行强硬政策挑起民众对北京的仇视。

An attack on Taiwan would be immensely risky; it would terrify China’s other Asian neighbors and potentially bring China into direct conflict with the U.S., Taiwan’s main military backer.

对台进攻具有极大风险，这可能让中国的亚洲邻国不安并潜在地把中国带往与美国的直接冲突，后者是台湾的主要武器後援国。

The critical question, though, is whether the risks outweigh the danger to Mr. Xi if Taiwan appears to be drifting permanently away under his watch. No Chinese leader can afford to let that happen, and Mr. Xi has built his popularity around a muscular brand of nationalism that puts him under greater pressure to take action.

一个关键的问题，是否对习来说甘冒这个险比让台湾在他眼皮下走的渐行渐远来的好？没有中国领导人可以承受那样结果，而且习近平到处打起了强国的民族牌，这使他面临更大的压力去采取行动。

As a political goal, unification is now a nonstarter in Taiwan. But Mr. Xi can’t wait forever. Compared with Taiwan, all the other island disputes in East Asia—including one that’s bubbling now over China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea—are a sideshow.

统一现在在台湾是一个不切实际的政治目标。但是习近平不可能永远等下去。比起台湾问题，在东海的其他岛屿争议连同现在中国的南海人造岛都是一段小插曲罢了。

以下是华尔街日报的读者评论：


ROBERT LANIER
Let China have Taiwan and change the name back to Formosa.  Who cares.

让中国收回台湾把名字改回福尔摩莎吧。谁会在乎。


David Graul
Let’s see now.  Obama allowed Al Qaeda to drive the U.S. out of Iraq.  He is in the process of allowing the Taliban to drive the U.S. out of Afghanistan.  He was forced by Putin to back off his “red line” threat against Bashar al-Assad.  He has acceded to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.  He caved to the mullahs’ every demand to get a worthless treaty.

I don’t see much chance of a confrontation with China over Taiwan.  And I’m pretty sure China’s neighbors are already alarmed.

现在看看吧。奥巴马允许基地组织促成美国撤出伊拉克。他是在放任塔利班促成美国走出阿富汗的进程。他还在普丁的强迫下对阿萨德收回红线。他也同意俄罗斯对克里米亚和东乌克兰的并吞。他屈从于毛拉的每一个要求得到一个毫无价值的条约。

我看不到台湾与中国的对抗能有多少机会。而且我相当肯定的说中国的邻国都已经屁滚尿流了。